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Abstract 
Purpose - This study examines the extent to which board characteristics and ownership 
structure affect firm performance with specific focus on providing new empirical insights 
following the revised Corporate Governance (CG) code 2012.  
Design/methodology/approach - This study uses a sample of non-financial firms listed on 
Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX)-100 index for the years 2011 to 2014. Firm performance is 
measured by accounting-based performance indicators (ROA and ROE) and market-based 
performance indicators (Tobin’s Q and MTB). This study employs multivariate regression 
techniques including Fixed Effects Model (FE) and Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS).  
Findings - The findings show that board diversity increases over the two time periods (Pre-
2012 and Post-2012), whereas there are cases that companies have not fully complied with the 
revised CG code 2012 in terms of board independence. In addition, the multiple regression 
results show that firm performance is negatively and significantly associated with institutional 
ownership. Nevertheless, the results show that board size, board independent, board diversity 
and board meetings do not have significant impact on firm performance. The findings are fairly 
consistent and robust across two time periods (Pre-2012 and Post 2012) and a number of 
econometric models that sufficiently address the potential endogeneity problems.  
Originality/value - To the best of our knowledge, this is the first empirical study which 
investigates the impact of the compliance and implementation of 2012 corporate governance 
code on firm performance in Pakistan. This study is different from the most prior studies in 
that we utilize independent non-executive directors rather than conventional non-executive 
directors to measure board independence. 
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1. Introduction 
Existing literature suggests that better governance plays an important role in corporation as it 
provides oversight, mitigates scandals, increases a firm’s access to external finance, ensures 
efficient allocation of resources and fosters better relationships among stakeholders (Claessens 
and Yurtoglu, 2013). Corporations in both developed and emerging markets have employed 
different corporate governance mechanisms including (I) board size; (II) executive 
compensation; (III) debt; and (IV) the market for corporate control to ensure company is run 
effectively and stakeholders are protected. Over recent years calls in academic research, policy 
and media for reform in corporate governance have intensified. In line with such calls, 
corporations such as BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street, which constitutes three of the 
world’s largest asset managers with about $11 trillion assets, recently expanded their corporate 
governance teams to ensure they effectively monitor the activities of the companies they invest 
in (Marriage, 2017).  
Evidence from previous studies has been mixed on the directions of the implication of 
corporate governance on firm performance. It is suggested that the effectiveness of corporate 
governance in emerging markets is different to that in developed markets, as emerging markets 
are characterized by firms that are closely held, lack appropriate mechanisms to enforce 
shareholders’ legal rights, and are in need for transparency (Gibson, 2003). To this effect, 
several studies were instituted that examined the impact of corporate governance mechanisms 
on firm performance in the context of emerging markets. For example, Bhatt and Bhatt (2017) 
examined the effect of Malaysian code of corporate governance on the performance of listed 
firms in Bursa Malaysia. Arora and Sharma (2016) investigated the impact of corporate 
governance on firm performance in the context of India. It is evident that in spite of the attempts 
at improving the corporate governance in Pakistan, there is limited empirical study channeled 
to investigate its effects.  
This study seeks to extend as well as make a number of contributions to the extant CG literature. 
First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first empirical study which investigates the impact 
of the compliance and implementation of 2012 corporate governance code on firm performance 
in Pakistan. Second, there is a requirement for the firms to evaluate the performance within 
two years of implementation of CG code 2012 by the SECP. Therefore, we offer timely 
evidence by examining whether board characteristics (board size, board independence, board 
diversity and board meeting) and ownership structure (managerial ownership and institutional 
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ownership) may enhance firm performance using a sample of non-financial firms listed on the 
Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) 100 index following changes in regulatory environment. 
Third, different from most prior studies, we utilize independent non-executive directors rather 
than conventional non-executive directors to measure the board independence. Fourth, we use 
alternative econometric models to address the endogeneity problems. Finally, we split our 
sample into two sub-samples in order to investigate whether the CG mechanisms have changed 
over two time periods and the revised CG code 2012 has any impact on the firm performance 
during different sample periods (e.g. pre-2012 and post-2012).  
The reminder of the paper is organized as follow. Section 2 reviews the literature and develops 
the hypotheses. Section 3 outlines the methodology and data and section 4 discusses the 
findings of the paper. The final section presents the summary and conclusion.  
 
2. The development of corporate governance in Pakistan 
Like other countries around the world, Pakistan has been actively pursuing the CG reforms 
over the last fifteen years. The original CG code was introduced in 2002 by Securities Exchange 
Commission of Pakistan (SECP) and it was made mandatory for all Pakistani listed firms (Tariq 
and Abbas, 2013). The main objective of the code is to improve the confidence of investor in 
the way a company is operated and to tackle the problems that are related to developing 
economies such as failure to pay dividends over a long period (Ashraf and Ghani, 2005). 
However, the implementation of this code resulted in de-listing of firms because they were not 
able to understand the regulations of the code and in 2006 CIPE (Centre for International 
Private Enterprise) conducted a seminar to discern whether firms understood the code and to 
determine whether the code required any modifications (Fudda, 2007). Then, the revised CG 
code was issued in 2012 which was a vital move to make directors more accountable (Awan, 
2014). Moreover, the Pakistan Institute of Corporate Governance (PICG) further enhances the 
awareness of the advantages of implementing the CG code (Salman and Siddique, 2013).  
The earlier CG code 2002 recommended that one independent director should sit on the board, 
the executive directors should not be more than seventy-five percent of the total board 
members, chairman of the board and audit committee (AC) should preferably be a non-
executive director (NED), and ACs were allowed to have executive directors as their members 
(SECP, 2002). However, the revised CG code 2012 stipulated that the board should have at 
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least one independent director, the executive directors cannot be more than one-third of the 
total number of board members, CEO (Chief Executive Officer) and Chairman should not be 
the same person, chairman of the board must be a NED, chairman of the AC must be an 
independent director and AC should consist of NEDs only (SECP, 2014). Noticeably, the 
changes on the number of executive directors and non-executive directors suggests that the 
government is aware of the increasing importance of NEDs which brings fresh perspective, 
experience and networks to the firms but also aims to reduce the power of executive directors 
and to increase the independence of the board so that the boards can be properly managed and 
monitored.  
Board diversity was not specified in the original CG Code 2002 while the revised CG code 
2012 recommended gender diversity on the boards (SECP, 2002 and 2014). This is probably 
due to the trends and recent practices of other countries. For instance, the 2009 Luxembourg 
CG code recommended gender diversity on the boards, and the 2009 Austria CG code also 
recommended that both male and female directors should be appropriately represented on 
supervisory boards (European Commission, 2016). It should be noted that there will be an 
annual evaluation of the performance of the board within two years of implementation of CG 
code 2012 (SECP, 2014), therefore it will be interesting to see if the firms have adopted any 
new recommendations in response to the latest CG code after 2012. To highlight the main 
changes in the two codes (2002 and 2012), a comparison of the CG code 2002 and the revised 
CG code 2012 is presented in the Table 1 and these provisions cover six main areas: board 
evaluation, board independence, executive directors, leadership, audit committee and board 
diversity. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
3. Literature review and hypotheses development 
3.1 Board size 
The size of the board and its composition are rational responses to the conditions of the external 
environment, current internal situation and previous financial performance of a firm (Pearce 
and Zahra, 1992). Sheikh et al. (2013) argue that firms benefit from a large board size as the 
expertise and skills of large members would be utilized to improve firm performance. In 
addition, the efficiency perspective of the neo-institutional theoretical framework indicates that 
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large board size increases monitoring, as dominant CEOs might find it difficult to influence all 
the members of the board (Elmagrhi et al., 2016). Another strand of the literature proposes an 
opposing arguing to the above mentioned. For example, a large board size may find it difficult 
to reach a consensus that may result in unnecessarily scheduling meetings (Cheng, 2008; Arora 
and Sharma, 2016). To the extent that time is wasted in making investment decisions, a firm’s 
performance may be affected.  Nguyen and Faff (2007) show that large board size erodes firm 
value as it may be costly to resolve conflicts and coordinate communication flows and 
decisions among large number of people. They find that smaller boards have positive impact 
on firm performance, indicating that interests of shareholders are better represented. Therefore, 
we propose the following hypothesis: 
H1. There is a negative relationship between board size and firm performance.  
 
3.2 Board independence 
Non-executive directors (NEDs) are expected to oversee the utilization of firm resources by 
executives (Mura, 2007), therefore they help to mitigate the agency problems and safeguard 
the interests of shareholders (Froud et al., 2008). NEDs have different backgrounds which 
provide various perspectives to the board and reduces complacency (Mathew et al., 2016) and 
also have the expertise to provide impartial judgement (Sundarasen et al., 2016). Furthermore, 
NEDs have their reputation and career at stake which force them to be very careful in ensuring 
the executive directors always work for the benefit of shareholders. The presence of non-
executive directors may improve firm performance. The independence of NEDs could provide 
incentives to advice and monitor the activities of the management, ensuring the interests of 
shareholders are protected (Mura, 2007; Duchin et al., 2010). Liu et al. (2015) find that state-
owned firms having non-executive directors reduce insider self-dealing, improve investment 
efficiency, and enhance firm performance. Benkel et al, (2006) find that the presence of non-
executive directors on the board can improve earnings report, as there will be reduced levels of 
earnings management. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: 
   H2. There is a positive relationship between board independence and firm performance.  
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3.3 Board diversity 
Prior research demonstrates that firm performance is impacted by board diversity (Hillman, 
2015; Kumar and Zattoni, 2016). For example, board with a different gender, ethnicity, and/or 
cultural background would be more likely to make suggestion, ask questions and allocate more 
time to board monitoring thereby improving performance than directors with more traditional 
backgrounds (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). In support of resource dependence theory, studies 
suggest that a board with diverse experiences, skills and knowledge would make better 
decisions that improve overall performance of the company (Hillman, 2015). Nguyen and Faff 
(2007) report that board diversity increases the effectiveness of management and enhance their 
leadership role, creativities and innovation. Female representation on the board, in particular, 
improves board monitoring role, reduces agency costs (Farag and Mallin, 2016), and enhances 
the quality of board discussions that would increase firm performance. Further, men consider 
only the economic effects when making corporate decisions whereas women consider every 
situation that affect the quality of their decision (Hillman, 2015). Thus, we propose the 
following hypothesis:  
H3. There is a positive relationship between board diversity and firm performance. 
 
3.4 Managerial ownership 
According to agency theory, directors are opportunistic unless they have proper incentive 
(Abdallah and Ismail, 2017; Kumar and Zattoni, 2016), so managerial ownership is important 
as it acts as an incentive mechanism. The alignment theory argues that to the extent that 
managers hold shares in their firm, the interests of the shareholders is better served (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Stemming from the agency cost reduction theory, it is argued that managerial 
shareholding reduces the costs arising from conflict of interests between managers and 
shareholders, thus improving access to external finance and reducing cost of capital (Claessens 
and Yurtoglu, 2013). On the other hand, the entrenchment theory literature argues that increase 
in managerial shareholding will increase voting power of managers which will allow managers 
to pursue decisions that only cater to their interests (Kwansa et al., 2014). Weir (1997) find 
that managers of acquired firms are less motivated to pursue the interests of the shareholders 
due to holding significantly lower shares in the firms. Using Malaysian non-financial firms, 
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Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) report a negative association between managerial shareholding and 
firm performance. In line with existing studies, we propose the following hypothesis: 
    H4. There is a negative relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. 
 
3.5 Institutional ownership 
Institutional investors can affect firm performance, as they have the resources to monitor and 
scrutinize the activities of the management effectively thus dissuading managers from 
undertaking wasteful investments (Alipour, 2013). Having higher level of share ownerships 
provides institutional investors with incentives to vote with their feet thus mitigating managers’ 
opportunistic behaviour (Elmagrhi et al., 2016; Parrino et al., 2003). More recently, 
institutional investors have been found that they are more willing to utilise their ownership 
rights to persuade management to pursue activities in favour of shareholders (Cornett et al., 
2007). Institutional investors can showcase their power by transacting shares on the market or 
by influencing the strategies of the firm through representation on the board (Chaganti and 
Damanpour, 1991). However, institutional investors may collude with the firm’s executives 
which will negatively affect firm performance (Jong et al., 2005). Extant literature provides 
evidence that institutional investors can terminate poorly performing Chief Executive Officers 
(CEOs) to ensure firm performance improve over time (Aggarwal et al., 2011). Institutional 
shareholders through activism and herding can voice their dissatisfaction over bad firm 
performance by forcing CEO turnover (Parrino et al., 2003). Thus, we propose the following 
hypothesis: 
    H5. There is a negative relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance. 
 
3.6 Board meeting 
Board meeting has implications on firm performance through strategic advice about investment 
opportunities (Vafeas, 1999). For example, managers’ interests are better aligned with those of 
shareholders when outside directors attend meetings. This is because outside directors are more 
likely to collect information, make decisions and monitor management activities during board 
meetings (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Vafeas (1999) shows that frequency of board meetings 
leads to increased growth opportunities and merger and acquisition. Mishra et al (2009) point 
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out that board meetings are informative corporate events that could lead to informed trading 
through significant changes in the bid-ask spread. Demirtas (2017) reports that returns and 
premiums of the shareholder at target firm increases when the directors meet early after the 
beginning of a sale process increases. By contrast, another stream of studies argues that there 
is a negative association between board meetings and firm performance. Given the limited time 
spent at board meetings, directors would not make meaningful exchange of ideas that would 
improve firm performance. Ebrahim (2007) finds that high meeting frequency leads to high 
level of earnings management. Studies also find that high meeting frequency is positively 
related with the probability of committing fraud, which is likely to slow down earnings per 
share (EPS) growth (Chen et al., 2006). Thus, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H6. There is a negative relationship between board meeting and firm performance. 
 
4. Research design 
4.1 Data and sample 
Our sample comprises all the non-financial firms listed on Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX)-
100 index the years 2011 to 2014. Consistent with prior corporate governance literature 
(Elmagrhi et al., 2016; Sheikh et al., 2013), financial firms are excluded from our initial sample 
since they are highly leveraged and subject to different regulations. We consider the years from 
2011 to 2014 because it allows us to evaluate the effects of the revised CG code in Pakistan 
and its implication on firm performance. PSX-100 index covers 85% of the total market 
capitalization of Pakistan Stock Exchange (Malik and Zahoor, 2016). The data was manually 
collected from annual reports and Financial Times. Firms have to meet the following criteria 
in order to be included into the final sample: (a) annual reports of firms are available for the 
whole sample period, (b) firms’ financial performance data can be accessed for the whole 
sample period, (c) firms have to be continuously listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange from 
2011 to 2014. Finally, firms from seven industries are included and Table 2 summarize the 
composition of the final sample. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
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4.2 Empirical model and variables measurement 
In order to assess the effects of board characteristics and ownership structure on firm 
performance, we use both univariate and multivariate analyses. In order to choose the most 
suitable estimation between pooled regression and panel fixed/random effects, two types of 
tests were performed. First, both F-test and Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test are significant 
(p<0.05) for all performance measures therefore panel data analysis is preferred. Second, we 
conduct the Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) to decide between fixed effect and random effect 
models. We find that Hausman test is significant (p<0.1) for all performance measures which 
indicates fixed effects model should be utilized. The results are reported in Appendix 1. In 
order to address the concerns of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, this study utilizes 
fixed effects model with standard errors clustered at firm level. We present the results for both 
fixed-effects and OLS for comparison purposes. Using firm performance as dependent 
variable, we develop the following model:  
FPit = β0 + β1BSit + β2INDit + β3DIVit + β4MOit + β5IOit + β6BMit + β7LEVit + β8AGEit + 
β9SIZEit + Ɛit                                                                                        
Where FP (firm performance) is measured by both accounting-based measures: return on assets 
(ROA) and return on equity (ROE) and market-based measures: Tobin’s Q (Q) and market to 
book (MTB).  BS is board size; IND is the percentage of independent non-executive directors; 
DIV is diversity which is measured by the percentage of female directors sitting on the board; 
MO is managerial ownership; IO is institutional ownership; BM is board meeting. Leverage 
(LEV), firm age (AGE) and firm size (SIZE) were used as control variables. Industry effect 
and year effect was controlled through dummy variables. Table 3 defines the all the dependent, 
independent variables and control variables. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
Following the previous research (Mashayekhi and Bazaz, 2008), the accounting-based firm 
performance is measured by return on assets ratio (ROA), i.e. profit before tax as percentage 
of total assets and return on equity ratio (ROE), i.e. profit after tax as percentage of total equity, 
the market-based performance is measured by Tobin’s Q, i.e. the book value of long term debt 
and market value of the equity divided by the book value of the total asset and market to book 
ratio (MTB), i.e. market value of firm divided by book value of firm. We use board size (BS), 
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board independence (IND), board diversity (DIV), managerial ownership (MO) and 
institutional ownership (IO) as corporate governance variables in the regression model. We 
also include a number of control variables in the regression given their effects on firm 
performance. Javed and Iqbal (2006) suggests that the effect of firm size should be controlled. 
We use natural log of sales to control for firm size (SIZE) as it was also used by Sheikh et al., 
(2013). We use ratio of total debt to total assets to measure leverage (LEV). Firm age (AGE) 
is also used as control variable as experienced firms are better equipped to strategize which 
results in better performance. Firm age is defined as years since incorporation (Yasser, 2011). 
If a firm belongs to a specific industry then the performance of the firm can be affected by 
specific characteristics of that industry. To control for the industry effect and year effect, 
dummy variables for industries and years were also included (El-Faitouri, 2014).  
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Panel A of Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for all the variables. Board size (BS) 
ranges from 6 to 15 with a mean value of 8.560, which means, on average, there are 9 members 
sitting on the board which is consistent with the prior study by Yasser (2011). The mean value 
of IND is 0.232, meaning, on average, independent NEDs comprised approximately 23.2% of 
the board. In order to explore the impact of the revised CG Code 2012, we divide our sample 
into two periods: Pre-2012 and Post-2012 and any changes across these two periods will now 
be considered in more detail. Panel B of Table 4 shows the changes across the two types of 
performance measures (accounting-based and market-based) and it can be seen that the firm 
performance has been improved during the two periods. For instance, ROA increased from 
11.924 (Pre-2012) to 14.272 (Post-2012) with a change of 19.69% and similarly ROE increased 
from 17.586 (Pre-2012) to 21.003 (Post-2012) with a change of 19.43%. There was a 
substantial increase in the market-based performance measures and the findings show that 
Tobin’s q increased by 63.28% from 1.386 to 2.263 whilst MTB has doubled from 1.842 to 
3.748 during two periods.  
Panel C of Table 4 shows the changes across two time periods in CG mechanisms and there 
was a variation between different mechanisms. Board size (BS) has been quite stable and does 
not change during the Pre-2012 and Post-2012 periods and ranges from 6 to 15 with a mean 
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value of 8.56. Board independence (IND) shows that there was a significant decrease of 22.10% 
from a mean value of 0.267 to 0.208 over the two time periods and suggest that some companies 
have not fully complied with the revised CG code 2012 in terms of “one-third of the board are 
recommended to be independent directors”. Moreover, the minimum value of IND was 0 across 
the two periods indicates that some companies have not complied the revised CG code 2012 as 
which the company must has “at least one independent director on the board”. Percentage of 
female directors (DIV) sitting on the board increased from 0.044 (Pre-2012) to 0.054 (Post-
2012) with a change of 22.72%, which seems to follow the recommendation by the new CG 
code 2012 that “diversified board is recommended”. In terms of the ownership structure, 
managerial ownership decreased from 11.473 to 11.036 while institutional ownership increased 
from 0.792 to 0.846 over the two time periods. Finally, board meeting has slightly decreased 
from 5.29 to 5.14 with a very small change of 2.83% across two periods.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
5.2 Correlation matrix 
Table 5 reports the results of Pearson correlation matrix for all the variables. It indicates that 
there is no potential multicollinearity in our regression models as the level of correlation 
between variables is relatively low. Furthermore, we use the variance inflation factor (VIF) to 
double-check the potential issue of multicollinearity. Yusr et al. (2012) suggests that if 
tolerance value is more than 0.1 and the value of VIF is less than 10, the issue of 
multicollinearity is not severe. Table 6 presents tolerance and VIF values and the values of VIF 
well below 10 and tolerance values are also above 0.1, indicating that there are no 
multicollinearity problems.  
Insert Table 5 and 6 about here 
 
5.3 Regression results and discussion 
Table 7 reports the regression results from Fixed-effect. In Table 7, Column (1) and (2) are 
estimated using ROA and ROE as dependent variable. Firstly, the coefficient of board size 
(BS) is positive for both ROA and ROE, but the results are insignificant. Therefore, H1 is not 
supported. This indicates firms could benefit from a large board size as the expertise and skills 
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of large members would be utilized to improve firm performance. The result is consistent with 
the studies of Malik et al. (2016) and Kutum (2015) but contradicts with prior studies such as 
Dharmadasa et al. (2014) and Mashayekhi and Bazaz (2008). Secondly, although the 
percentage of independent non-executive directors (IND) is positively related to ROA and 
ROE, but the results are insignificant. Thus, H2 is not supported. This suggests that board with 
more independent non-executive directors increase the firm performance consistent with the 
findings of prior studies (Ali and Nasir, 2014; Javeed et al., 2014; Yekini et al., 2015). 
However, the insignificance of the result could be attributed to the very low percentage of 
independent NED of 23% compared to the requirements of the revised code that executive 
directors should not be more than one third. Yekini et al. (2015) provided evidence that 
companies with two-third NEDs reported higher and quality performance over those with lesser 
percentage of NED. Thirdly, gender diversity (DIV) is negatively and significantly associated 
with ROA and ROE. Therefore, H3 is not supported. The result supports the view that great 
gender diversity may result in more conflicts and thus decision making may be more difficult 
and less effective. Fourth, managerial ownership (MO) is negatively correlated with ROA and 
ROE but the result is insignificant. Therefore, H4 is not supported. The result supports the 
entrenchment theory which argues that increase in managerial shareholding will increase 
voting power of managers which will allow managers to pursue decisions that only cater to 
their interests (Kwansa et al., 2014). Fifth, institutional ownership (IO) is negatively and 
significantly associated with ROA and ROE, thus H5 is supported. The result is consistent with 
the findings of Jong et al. (2005) and Aljifri and Moustafa (2007). The evidence contradicts to 
the assumption that firms with increased institutional ownership are associated with less 
information asymmetry and agency problems, which can positively affect firm performance. 
Finally, board meeting (BM) is negatively but insignificantly associated with ROA and ROE. 
Therefore, H6 is not supported. Previous studies have expressed the concerns over frequent 
board meetings which may reduce the limited time non-executives spend with the firm and the 
resources instead should be utilized in more productive activities.  
Insert Table 7 about here 
 
5.4 Additional analyses 
In order to further examine the robustness of our results, we conduct a number of additional 
tests. First, we replace the accounting-based measures of ROA and ROE with market-based 
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measures of Tobin’s Q and MTB as dependent variable and re-estimate the effects of CG 
mechanisms on firm performance. The results are reported in Column (3) and (4) of Table 7. 
Overall, the findings are similar to the results reported in Column (1) and (2), this indicates our 
results are robust to using alternative market-based performance measures.  
Second, we adopt an instrumental approach to address the potential endogeneity issues which 
might arise from the relationship between firm performance and CG mechanisms. More 
specifically, following the existing literature (Fang et al., 2009), we use the lagged value of 
board characteristics (board size, board independence, board diversity, board meeting) and 
ownership (managerial ownership and institutional ownership) as instruments that are 
correlated with board and ownership variables but are not correlated with the error term. 
Therefore, to control for unobserved firm level characteristics, we re-estimate Model 1 to 4 of 
Table 7 using the Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) model. The results reported in Model 1 to 
4 of Table 8 are similar to the results reported in Table 7, suggesting that our findings are robust 
to the presence of potential endogeneity issue.  
Insert Table 8 about here 
 
Third, due to the fact that there is a requirement for the firms to evaluate the performance within 
two years of implementation of the new CG code 2012, this provides us a good opportunity to 
examine the impact of the revised code on firm performance. Table 9 shows the impact of 
corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance for the period of Pre-2012 and overall 
findings show that most of the CG mechanisms are not statistically significant in determining 
the firm performance. For instance, board size (BS) and board diversity (DIV) have positive 
impact on firm performance, however the results are not statistically significant. Institutional 
ownership (IO) is negatively and significantly associated with firm performance measures 
(accounting and market based). The results are similar to the findings reported in Table 7 and 
8 and it is consistent with the findings of Aljifri and Moustafa (2007). The evidence contradicts 
to the assumption that firms with increased institutional ownership are associated with less 
information asymmetry and agency problems, which can positively affect firm performance. 
Finally, board meeting (BM) is overall negatively related to firm performance although the 
results are not significant. The findings indicate that the firms tend to have frequent meetings 
to address different issues from poor performance (Vafeas, 1999). The insignificant 
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relationship between CG mechanisms and firm performance could be explained by lacking of 
detailed CG code before 2012.  
Table 10 shows the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance for the 
period of Post-2012. It can be seen that overall the findings for the Post-2012 are similar to the 
Pre-2012 period. For instance, institutional ownership (IO) is negatively and significantly 
associated with firm performance measures (accounting and market based). However, board 
independence is positively and significantly related to market-based performance measures 
(Tobin’s q and MTB) which is different from the Pre-2012 period. The findings suggest that 
board with more independent non-executive directors improve the firm performance (Ali and 
Nasir, 2014). In terms of board diversity and board meetings, the results suggest they are not 
statistically significant in affecting firm performance. Overall, the results show that the 
relationship between firm performance and corporate governance mechanisms is not strongly 
linked and this may due to the factors that firms in Pakistan did not comply with the new CG 
code 2012 in the earlier stage which can be seen from the results of descriptive statistics. 
Insert Table 9 and 10 about here 
 
6. Conclusions and suggestions 
This study examines the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance in 
Pakistan using a sample of firms listed on PSX-100 index from 2011 to 2014.  This study seeks 
to extend as well as make a number of contributions to the extant literature. First, we contribute 
to the extant literature by offering new empirical evidence on compliance and implementation 
of 2012 corporate governance code in Pakistan. Second, we offer timely evidence by examining 
whether board characteristics (board size, board independence, board diversity and board 
meeting) and ownership structure (managerial ownership and institutional ownership) may 
affect firm performance using a sample of non-financial firms listed on Pakistan Stock 
Exchange (PSX)-100 index following a change in regulatory environment. Third, different 
from most prior studies, we utilize independent non-executive directors rather than 
conventional non-executive directors to measure the board independence. Fourth, we use 
alternative econometric models to address the endogeneity problems. Finally, we split our 
sample into two sub-samples in order to investigate whether the CG mechanisms changes over 
two time periods and the revised CG code 2012 has any impact on the firm performance during 
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different sample periods (e.g. pre-2012 and post 2012). Overall, the results show that the 
relationship between firm performance and corporate governance mechanisms is not strongly 
linked and this may due to the factors that firms in Pakistan did not follow the recommendations 
of the new CG code 2012 in the earlier stage.  
Our findings have important implications for policymakers, regulators, shareholders, 
companies, government and other countries. First, our results show that the relationship 
between performance and governance is not strong in Pakistan, indicating that recommendation 
of the revised CG code 2012 may not be adopted widely within the firms. This provides 
policymakers and regulators with a strong motivation to find ways to encourage the adoption 
further. Second, we have found a negative relationship between institutional ownership and 
firm performance, suggesting that institutional investors have failed to monitor the firms 
properly. Policymakers or government may think about how to increase shareholder activism, 
especially institutional investors. Third, we found that the percentage of independent NED is 
still very low in Pakistan. This finding has important implications for boards and policy makers 
who are interested in achieving optimal board composition. Since there has been evidence of 
improved performance with higher NEDs, corporations should take this provision of the 
revised code seriously and consider increasing the number of their NEDs. Finally, female 
directors seem still not common in Pakistan and corporations may also think about how to 
further promote board diversity in the future.   
There are some limitations to our study. Our study was restricted with respect to the number of 
corporate governance variables due to the data limitations although we have used fixed effects 
models to address this issue. Future studies may consider including other factors (e.g. audit, 
remuneration and nomination committees, director networks, etc) when data becomes 
available. Due to the fact that all the data was manually collected from the annual reports, we 
have used the sample of PSX-100 index over the period of 2011 to 2014.  Future studies can 
extend our study by including more sample firms and cover longer period. Finally, our study 
mainly uses secondary data and future studies may improve our findings by conducting in-
depth interviews, questionnaire or case studies to gain insights of corporate governance 
practices and their relationship with firm performance.  
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Table 1 
A comparison of the CG code 2002 and the revised CG code 2012 
CG provisions CG code 2002 CG code 2012 
Board Evaluation Not specified Annual evaluation of the 
performance of the Board 
within two years of 
implementation of CG code 
2012 
Board Independence One independent director on the 
board is recommended 
At least one independent 
director on the board and 
one-third of the board are 
recommended to be 
independent directors 
Executive Directors Maximum 75% of the directors 
on the board are executive 
directors 
Maximum 1/3rd of the 
directors on the board are 
executive directors 
Board Leadership The chairman should be non-
executive director 
The chairman and CEO 
should not be the same 
person 
Gender Diversity Not specified Diversified board is 
recommended 
Audit Committee The chairman should be non-
executive director 
Audit Committee should 
comprise of non-executive 
directors 
The above table was derived from SECP (2002) and SECP (2014). 
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Table 2 
Sample and Industry  
Industry No of firms % of sample 
Basic Material 9 14 
Oil and Gas 6 9 
Industrial 15 24 
Consumer goods and services 22 34 
Utilities 7 11 
Other 5 8 
Final sample 64 100 
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Table 3  
Variables Definition and Measurement 
Dependent variables  
ROA   Profit before tax as percentage of total asset 
ROE Profit after tax as percentage of total equity 
Tobin’s Q  The book value of long-term debt and market value of the equity 
divided by the book value of the total asset 
MTB  Market value of firm divided by book value of firm 
Independent variables  
BS Number of executive and non-executive directors. 
IND    Number of independent non-executive directors divided by the 
number of board members.  
DIV Number of female directors divided by the number of board 
members. 
MO Ordinary shares held by directors as percentage of total ordinary 
shares.  
IO Dummy variable for institutional shareholding where value is 1 if 
the institutional shareholding is greater than 5%, 0 otherwise.  
BM The number of board meetings.  
Control variables  
LEV Ratio of total debt to total assets 
AGE Years since firm was incorporated (Year of incorporation is 
included) 
SIZE The natural log of sales 
IND Dummy variables for each of the six industries: basic material; 
Oil and Gas; Industrial; Consumer goods and services; Utilities; 
Other.  
YEAR Dummy variables for the years 2011, 2012 and 2013 
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Table 4  
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for full sample 
 Full Sample 
 MEAN MIN MAX SD 
Performance Measures     
ROA 13.123 -13.992 59.725 10.944 
ROE 19.331 -35.442 97.494 17.091 
Tobin’s q 1.844 0.281 12.972 1.821 
MTB 2.802 0.420 34.06 4.731 
CG Mechanisms     
BS 8.559 6 15 1.812 
IND 0.232 0 0.929 0.163 
DIV 0.050 0 0.429 0.090 
MO 11.248 0 70.398 17.063 
IO 0.823 0 1 0.383 
BM 5.216 3 13 1.373 
Control Variables     
LEV 0.478 0.006 0.888 0.214 
AGE 38.031 3 154 24.515 
SIZE 9.581 0 12.432 2.228 
Variables are described as follows: return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), Tobin’s 
Q (Q), Market to Book (MTB), board size (BS), the proportion of independent non-executive 
directors (IND), board gender diversity (DIV), managerial ownership (MO), institutional 
ownership (IO), board meeting (BM), leverage (LEV), firm age (AGE) and firm size (SIZE).  
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Table 4 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for performance measures before and after 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C: Descriptive statistics for corporate governance mechanisms before and after 2012 
 Pre-2012 Post-2012 Change 
(%) 
 MEAN MIN MAX SD MEAN MIN MAX SD MEAN 
CG Mechanisms          
BS 8.560 7 15 1.802 8.558 6 15 1.8278 0 
IND 0.267 0 0.929 0.195 0.208 0 0.857 0.135 -22.10 
DIV 0.044 0 0.375 0.085 0.054 0 0.429 0.093 22.72 
MO 11.473 0 70.398 17.745 11.036 0 67.484 16.475 -3.80 
IO 0.792 0 1 0.408 0.846 0 1 0.361 6.81 
BM 5.292 4 13 1.412 5.142 3 11 1.335 -2.83 
 
 
 Pre-2012 Post-2012 Change (%) 
 MEAN MIN MAX SD MEAN MIN MAX SD MEAN 
Performance Measures          
ROA 11.924 -7.379 59.725 11.722 14.272 -13.992 43.372 10.055 19.69 
ROE 17.586 -35.442 97.494 18.982 21.003 -18.102 80.054 14.943 19.43 
Tobin’s q 1.386 0.281 5.42 1.007 2.263 0.321 12.972 2.255 63.28 
MTB 1.842 0.420 21.390 2.861 3.748 0.400 34.060 5.882 103.47 
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Table 5 
Pearson Correlation Matrix 
  ROA ROE Q MTB BS IND DIV MO IO BM LEV AGE SIZE 
ROA 1             
ROE .809** 1            
Q .476** .463** 1           
MTB .323** .477** .880** 1          
BS -0.021 0.1 0.033 0.026 1         
IND -0.125 -0.111 -0.127 -0.102 0.108 1        
DIV .292** .333** 0.048 0.032 .213** 0.041 1       
MO 0.046 0.071 -0.055 -0.069 -.205** 0.041 -0.028 1      
IO -.196** -.278** -.536** -.524** -0.01 0.115 0.055 -0.071 1     
BM -0.125 -0.027 -0.103 -0.115 .226** .203** 0.067 0.125 0.112 1    
LEV -.166* -0.097 -0.06 0.045 0.087 0.009 -0.007 0 0.017 0.039 1   
AGE 0.102 -0.089 .169* 0.082 -0.014 0.145 -0.031 0.001 -.174* -.148* -0.068 1  
SIZE .130* .223** 0.039 0.084 -0.114 -0.111 0.069 -0.084 -0.113 -.251** -.258** -0.082 1 
***, ** and * represent significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 respectively. Variables are described as follows: return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), 
Tobin’s Q (Q), Market to Book (MTB), board size (BS), the proportion of independent non-executive directors (IND), board gender diversity (DIV), 
managerial ownership (MO), institutional ownership (IO), board meeting (BM), leverage (LEV), firm age (AGE) and firm size (SIZE). 
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Table 6 
VIF 
Variable    Tolerance VIF 
BS   0.589 1.698 
IND   0.561 1.783 
DIV   0.646 1.548 
MO   0.647 1.545 
IO   0.568 1.761 
BM   0.736 1.358 
LEV   0.535 1.870 
AGE   0.548 1.824 
SIZE    0.535 1.868 
Variables are described as follows: board size (BS), the proportion of independent non-
executive directors (IND), board gender diversity (DIV), managerial ownership (MO), 
institutional ownership (IO), board meeting (BM), leverage (LEV), firm age (AGE) and firm 
size (SIZE).  
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Table 7 
The impact of corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance using Fixed-Effects 
Models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ROA ROE Tobin’s Q MTB 
CG Mechanisms     
BS 0.351 1.442 -0.333 -0.560 
 (0.31) (0.83) (-1.92) (-1.70) 
IND 3.814 3.640 0.586 -1.961 
 (0.66) (0.40) (0.65) (-1.11) 
DIV -18.00* -23.12** 0.514 2.498 
 (-1.93) (-2.28) (0.26) (0.71) 
MO -0.0421 -0.001 -0.035 0.014 
 (-0.46) (-0.01) (-1.66) (0.45) 
IO -0.665* -5.289* -1.095* -2.202** 
 (-1.91) (-1.94) (-1.98) (-2.11) 
BM -0.426 -0.043 -0.047 -0.124 
 (-0.78) (-0.05) (-0.58) (-0.79) 
     
Control Variables     
LEV -39.13*** -18.94 -0.412 0.740 
 (-4.81) (-1.52) (-0.33) (0.34) 
AGE -1.074 -4.462** 0.213 0.189 
 (-1.18) (-2.93) (1.43) (0.71) 
SIZE 13.509** 15.40** 0.410 0.983 
 (2.77) (2.99) (0.53) (0.73) 
Constant 25.72 -23.14 -7.902 -10.45 
 (1.90) (-0.29) (-1.00) (-0.73) 
     
R-squared 0.530 0.373 0.544 0.550 
Year effects YES YES YES YES 
Industry effects YES YES YES YES 
F-Value 6.58*** 3.35*** 6.51*** 6.02*** 
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Variables are described as         
follows: board size (BS), the proportion of independent non-executive directors (IND),    
board gender diversity (DIV), managerial ownership (MO), institutional ownership (IO), 
board meeting (BM), leverage (LEV), firm age (AGE) and firm size (SIZE). Standard errors 
are clustered at firm level.  
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Table 8 
The impact of corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance using Two-Stage 
Least Squares (2SLS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ROA ROE Tobin’s Q MTB 
CG Mechanisms     
BS 1.204 1.454 -0.003 -0.878 
 (0.559) (0.392) (-0.031) (-1.516) 
IND 27.67 6.911 6.224** 0.130 
 (1.081) (0.191) (2.009) (0.010) 
DIV 7.735 -13.62 -3.780 -39.54* 
 (0.243) (-0.310) (-0.752) (-1.856) 
MO 0.410* 0.554 0.023 0.065 
 (1.662) (1.500) (1.345) (0.529) 
IO -13.67*** -23.13*** -6.429*** -15.90*** 
 (-2.749) (-3.468) (-6.776) (-3.609) 
BM -4.923 -1.563 0.356 5.036 
 (-1.226) (-0.286) (0.456) (1.521) 
Control Variables     
LEV 1.115 39.35*** 1.112 9.673 
 (0.113) (2.884) (1.026) (1.479) 
AGE 0.126 0.212 -0.009 0.003 
 (0.968) (1.138) (-0.750) (0.044) 
SIZE -0.743 0.439 -0.007 1.348 
 (-0.367) (0.137) (-0.035) (1.228) 
Constant 41.67 8.865 4.866 -22.12 
 (0.984) (0.130) (0.848) (-1.119) 
     
R-squared 0.179 0.387 0.704 0.475 
Year effects YES YES YES YES 
Industry effects YES YES YES YES 
F-Value 9.77*** 14.14*** 8.42*** 5.06*** 
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Variables are described as 
follows: board size (BS), the proportion of independent non-executive directors (IND),    
board gender diversity (DIV), managerial ownership (MO), institutional ownership (IO), 
board meeting (BM), leverage (LEV), firm age (AGE) and firm size (SIZE). Standard errors 
are clustered at firm level.  
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Table 9 
The impact of corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance Pre-2012 period 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ROA ROE Tobin’s Q MTB 
BS 0.039 0.040 0.038 0.226 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.28) (0.84) 
IND 6.011 5.731 1.950 3.994 
 (0.40) (0.28) (1.09) (1.18) 
DIV 17.68 21.67 -0.146 0.038 
 (0.92) (0.83) (-0.06) (0.01) 
MO 0.155 0.153 0.009 0.019 
 (1.18) (0.85) (0.58) (0.66) 
IO -9.103** -11.58** -2.243*** -4.119*** 
 (-1.98) (-1.96) (-4.09) (-3.97) 
BM -0.621 -0.084 0.126 -0.123 
 (-0.44) (-0.04) (0.74) (-0.38) 
LEV -16.12 13.87 -0.547 1.428 
 (-1.71) (1.08) (-0.48) (0.66) 
AGE 0.063 0.004 -0.006 -0.013 
 (0.67) (0.04) (-0.60) (-0.56) 
SIZE 1.182 0.511 -0.0189 -0.219 
 (1.26) (0.40) (-0.17) (-1.05) 
Constant 21.40 21.43 5.667*** 9.968** 
 (1.38) (1.02) (3.06) (2.71) 
     
R-squared 0.312 0.220 0.368 0.380 
Year effects YES YES YES YES 
Industry effects YES YES YES YES 
F-Value 3.18*** 2.73** 3.06*** 3.04*** 
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Variables are described as 
follows: board size (BS), the proportion of independent non-executive directors (IND),    
board gender diversity (DIV), managerial ownership (MO), institutional ownership (IO), 
board meeting (BM), leverage (LEV), firm age (AGE) and firm size (SIZE). 
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Table 10 
The impact of corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance Post-2012 period 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ROA ROE Tobin’s Q MTB 
BS -0.092 -0.296 -0.110 -0.260 
 (-0.12) (-0.25) (-0.87) (-0.70) 
IND 20.84 28.00 5.416** 13.02* 
 (1.80) (1.59) (2.92) (2.44) 
DIV 2.569 2.276 -1.786 -6.531 
 (0.18) (0.11) (-0.75) (-0.88) 
MO 0.304** 0.282 0.001 -0.02 
 (2.90) (1.77) (0.08) (-0.48) 
IO -16.00*** -22.30*** -5.569*** -14.30*** 
 (-3.78) (-3.47) (-8.27) (-7.35) 
BM 0.0820 0.477 0.119 0.111 
 (0.08) (0.31) (0.72) (0.22) 
LEV -3.195 36.16** 1.245 12.62** 
 (-0.43) (3.18) (1.04) (3.45) 
AGE 0.039 0.040 -0.006 0.001 
 (0.53) (0.36) (-0.56) (0.00) 
SIZE 0.936 0.583 -0.052 -0.463 
 (1.44) (0.59) (-0.51) (-1.51) 
Constant 21.99 15.75 8.844*** 18.23*** 
 (1.98) (0.93) (5.01) (3.50) 
     
R-squared 0.349 0.379 0.690 0.677 
Year effects YES YES YES YES 
Industry effects YES YES YES YES 
F-Value 2.37** 2.69** 9.35*** 8.39*** 
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Variables are described as 
follows: board size (BS), the proportion of independent non-executive directors (IND),    
board gender diversity (DIV), managerial ownership (MO), institutional ownership (IO), 
board meeting (BM), leverage (LEV), firm age (AGE) and firm size (SIZE). 
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Appendix 1     
    
 F-test Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test Hausman test 
ROA 15.85 *** 63.05*** 39.27*** 
ROE 10.74 *** 66.92*** 18.93* 
Tobin's q 3.03*** 2.78** 38.82*** 
MTB 2.82*** 3.64** 22.30** 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
 
 
